This paper characterises optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous …rm entry, a cash-in-advance constraint and preset wages. Firms must make pro…ts to cover entry costs; thus the markup on goods prices is e¢ cient. Without it, pro…ts would be zero and no …rm would enter, resulting in zero production. However, because leisure is not priced at a markup, the consumption-leisure tradeo¤ is distorted. Leisure is too high relative to consumption. The consequence is that the real wage, hours and production are suboptimally low. Due to the labour requirement in entry, insu¢ cient labour supply also implies that entry is too low in equilibrium. The paper shows that in the absence of …scal instruments such as labour income subsidies, the optimal monetary policy under sticky wages achieves higher welfare than under ‡exible wages. The policy maker uses the money supply instrument to raise the real wage -the cost of leisure -above its ‡exible-wage level, in response to expansionary shocks to productivity and entry costs. This raises labour supply and expands the production of goods and new …rms.
Introduction
The creation of new …rms and products, also referred to as extensive margin investment, is of importance to macroeconomists and policy makers. It propagates and ampli…es shocks, see Bergin and Corsetti (2008) . Changes in product diversity have an impact on welfare and, if ignored, lead to a mismeasurement of price indices, see Broda and Weinstein (2007) . This paper asks whether, in the face of nominal rigidities, monetary policy should be concerned with movements in the number of …rms.
The presence or absence of entry costs is crucial for the desirability of price markups and pro…ts. If the number of producers is …xed or entry is costless, pro…ts are regarded as an undesirable distortion. However, if …rm entry is costly, pro…ts provide compensation for startup costs and therefore an incentive to enter the market. The markup on goods prices is in fact e¢ cient and not by itself distortionary. Rather, it is the absence of a markup on leisure that leads to a distortion of the leisure-consumption tradeo¤ and, as a result, to a misallocation of resources. Hours are too low, and therefore too little is produced at both the intensive margin (production of goods) and at the extensive margin (production of …rms). Instead of removing the markup on goods prices, policy should aim at bringing the markup on the price of leisure to the same level. As shown by Bilbiie et al (2008) , e¢ ciency can be restored through a labour income subsidy that aligns the two markups. The contribution of this paper is to show that under nominal rigidities, monetary policy can be used to mimick the e¤ect of a labour subsidy by manipulating the real wage in response to shocks. The intuition is that the misalignment of the markups on leisure and on consumption goods implies that the real wage, the price of leisure, is ine¢ ciently low.
The analysis is based on a stylised business cycle model with …rm entry as the only form of investment. There are three distortions: monopolistic competition, a cash-inadvance (CIA) constraint and preset wages. 1 Firms have monopoly power over the goods they produce. New …rms are established up to the point where monopoly pro…ts just cover entry costs, which are modelled as labour costs. The available (state-contingent) policy instruments are lump sum taxes, the interest rate and the money supply. Distortionary …scal instruments are unavailable. The policy maker commits to state-contingent paths for the model variables which maximise welfare, taking as given the optimal decisions of households and …rms. The main result is that optimal monetary policy under sticky wages achieves higher welfare than the ‡exible equilibrium, through its in ‡uence on the real wage. A policy of raising the real wage above its ‡exible-wage level in response to expansionary shocks increases hours and expands the production of goods and new …rms.
Di¤erent from cashless economy models, money is not determined residually here.
The CIA restriction on consumption purchases introduces a monetary friction and thus a role for money. Once the interest rate is set to its optimal level, the money supply can be used as a separate instrument for monetary policy. A zero net interest rate -the Friedman Rule -is optimal. This is a standard result in CIA models. Setting a higher interest rate taxes consumption relative to leisure, thereby worsening the aforementioned allocative distortion. At the Friedman Rule, the role of the money supply policy depends on whether wages are sticky or ‡exible; under ‡exible wages, allocations are given and the money supply pins down the price level. Under sticky wages, given that the net interest rate is set to zero, the money supply policy a¤ects allocations.
A closely related study is Ade ao et al (2003) , hereafter ACT, who consider optimal 1 Notice that entry itself does not give rise to a (net) externality under monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . In particular, there is a positive externality of entry on consumer surplus through an increase in product diversity. Entry also has a negative externality on …rm pro…ts through a "business-stealing e¤ect". These two e¤ects o¤set each other, such that the net externality is zero. For more details on this, see Bilbiie et al (2008) and Lewis (2010) .
monetary policy in an economy with sticky prices where …scal policy is restricted to lump sum taxation. They …nd that the optimal allocation under nominal rigidities and the ‡exible allocation are not the same when government spending shocks are taken into consideration. There are three notable di¤erences between this paper and ACT. First, investment and entry are absent and monopolistic markups are ine¢ cient in ACT. Second, this paper abstracts from government spending shocks, while in ACT, such shocks are the main driver of the result that replicating the ‡exible-price equilibrium is not welfaremaximising. This paper instead highlights the role of entry costs in rendering the ‡exible equilibrium ine¢ cient and how this ine¢ ciency can be addressed with monetary policy.
Third, ACT assume price stickiness while in this paper, prices are ‡exible and wages are sticky.
Berentsen and Waller (2008) analyse optimal monetary policy in a model with endogenous entry and a microfounded demand for money. They …nd that the Friedman Rule is optimal if the entry cost is modelled as a …xed cost. 2 In sticky-price models with endogenous …rm entry, Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie et al (2007) …nd that it is optimal to fully stabilise goods prices, i.e. to replicate the ‡exible-price solution, while letting the number of …rms ‡uctuate freely. In both studies, monetary frictions are ignored and appropriate …scal policies ensure that the ‡exible-price allocation is e¢ cient.
This paper instead considers monetary policy as a tool to stabilise ‡uctuations around a distorted steady state, i.e. in the absence of short-run …scal policy.
Model
The economy is initially in a state of nature denoted by s 0 . Thereafter, it is hit by a series of stochastic i.i.d. shocks to entry costs and to productivity. Every variable determined at time t is indexed by the history of shocks that have occurred up to t, denoted by s t .
Let S t be the set of possible state histories. The probability of observing a particular history is denoted by Pr (s t ).
Final Goods Sector
There is a mass N (s 
where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The …rst order condition gives the following input demand function
Substituting the input demand in the production function yields the price index
Intermediate Goods Sector
Intermediate …rms use labour L c (s t ) to produce di¤erentiated goods. They set prices to maximise pro…ts,
subject to the demand function given by (2) and the production function,
where W (s t ) is the wage rate and labour productivity Z (s t ) is exogenous with positive support. The optimal price is a constant 3 markup over marginal cost,
Pro…ts are a constant fraction of …rm revenue,
Returns to Product Diversity and Marginal Rate of Transformation
Under endogenous …rm entry, the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (1) exhibits increasing returns to product diversity. This has implications for how, in the aggregate, inputs are converted into …nal output. To understand the First Best e¢ ciency conditions presented in the next section, I now derive the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) for this economy.
The symmetry of the intermediate …rms' output levels implies that the production function of the …nal goods …rm reduces to
From (6) we see that 1 1 represents the degree of increasing returns to product diversity.
If

1
> 0, there are increasing returns to product diversity, which is true for > 1,
as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) assume. As ! 1, i.e. as the elasticity of substitution between inputs into …nal good production increases, the degree of increasing returns to product diversity diminishes. See also Kim (2004) . The symmetry of the intermediate goods prices implies that the aggregate price index is
The price index is decreasing in the number of di¤erentied goods. As the number of goods rises, it becomes less costly to produce the same amount of …nal output.
Next, I derive an aggregate production function for this economy by combining the production function of the intermediate goods …rms (3) with the production function of the …nal goods …rm under symmetry (6),
where
is total labour used in the production of goods. Di¤erenti-ating (8) with respect to labour, we have
One additional labour unit is transformed into N (s t )
In the standard model with a constant number of …rms, the MRT is simply equal to productivity Z (s t ). Then the aggregate and …rm-speci…c marginal rates of transformation are the same. Here, the aggregate MRT contains the endogenous term N (s t ) 1 1 owing to the increasing returns to product diversity. Raising the number of …rms by one unit gives rise to a positive externality on …nal output.
We can rewrite the aggregate production function (8) to express the economy-wide e¤ective labour requirement as
The reduction in the labour requirement from increasing the number of …rms is then obtained by di¤erentiating this expression with respect to N (s t ),
Firm Entry
Starting up a …rm requires labour services L f (s t ). Let F (s t ) denote the entry cost in the form of e¤ective labour units
is exogenous and has positive support. In nominal terms, the entry cost is
.
Households …nance the entry costs incurred by new …rms in exchange for claims on those …rms'pro…ts. Firms must pay the entry cost anew each period.
Households
There exists a continuum of measure 1 of households. Households choose paths for consumption C (s t ), wages and asset holdings to maximise 4 To simplify notation, I drop the h-subscript from here on, given that households are symmetric.
expected lifetime utility,
subject to a sequence of budget constraints explained below, labour demand from the labour packer L (h;
, and a cash-in-advance constraint,
The parameter is the households'subjective discount factor, U ( ) is strictly increasing and concave, V ( ) is strictly increasing and convex. At the start of period t, households make a portfolio allocation decision in the asset market facing the constraint . A share is denoted by S (f; s t ). Its price is a share of the …rm entry cost and its payo¤ is a share of the entrant's monopoly pro…ts earned at the end of period t and paid out as dividends at the start of period t + 1.
After the closure of asset markets, production takes place and goods markets open.
The agents work and use money to make consumption purchases. At the end of the period, they receive labour income and pay a lump sum tax T (s t ) to the government. At the beginning of period t + 1, households have a stock of wealth given by
Income from asset holdings consists of money carried over from the previous period, interest income on bond holdings and dividends on share holdings. Initial household wealth is zero, such that W (s 0 ) = 0. 7 At the beginning of time, N (s 0 ) …rms are given.
I rule out Ponzi schemes on asset holdings by assuming
The …rst order conditions for asset holdings imply
Equation (14) de…nes the households' stochastic discount factor, the marginal utility growth of nominal wealth, given a particular state of nature in t+1. The period-zero value
Combining (14) and (15) yields an arbitrage condition between risk-free and state-contingent bonds
. Equation (16) states that the cost of setting up a …rm must equal pro…ts discounted by the interest rate. Under ‡exible wages, (17) equates the real wage to a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, adjusted for the cost of holding money,
An alternative assumption is that wages are predetermined; that is, the wage rate in place in period t, W (s t ), is set in period t 1. This particular form of wage stickiness is chosen for simplicity. Under preset wages, the …rst order condition for wages is
Due to imperfect competition in the labour market, labour supply is reduced and hence leisure is increased relative to the perfectly competitive case. Imperfect competition in the goods market has a similar e¤ect: output and labour hours are lower than under perfect competition. Thus, leisure is sold at a discount, while consumption goods are sold at a markup. The theory of optimal taxation tells us that we want markups to be equal across all goods (consumption goods and leisure). Therefore, a markup or tax on leisure, equivalent to a labour subsidy, would be desirable.
There are two reasons for assuming sticky wages instead of sticky prices. First, Lewis are a constant fraction of revenue, which simpli…es considerably the optimality condition for share holdings and, as a result, the policy problem.
Government
The government makes a monetary transfer to the household in the asset market …nanced with an expansion of the money stock M s (s t ) and with lump sum taxes collected in the goods market. Thus, the government budget constraint is
Market Clearing
Labour is used to produce consumption goods and to produce …rms,
Using the respective production functions, labour market clearing requires
The market clearing conditions for …nal goods, for the two types of bonds, for shares and for money are, respectively,
De…nition 1: An imperfectly competitive equilibrium is a set of prices, allocations and policies, such that: …rst, the optimality conditions of the …nal goods …rm, the intermediate goods …rms, the labour packer and the household are satis…ed; second, all markets clear.
First Best Allocation
The First Best allocation is de…ned as the allocation chosen by a benevolent social planner who maximises the utility of the representative household subject to the resource constraint. It is a useful benchmark with which one can compare any constrained-e¢ cient allocation. The First Best problem is as follows,
The resource constraint (22) is derived by substituting the …nal goods production function under symmetry (6) in the labour market clearing condition (19). It states that the total amount of (e¤ective) labour is equal to labour used in the production of goods plus labour required for the production of …rms. The First Best allocation satis…es
Equation (23) is an intrasectoral e¢ ciency condition. It states that the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption, V L (s t ) =U C (s t ), must equal the aggregate marginal rate of transformation. See (9) . Equation (24) is an intersectoral e¢ ciency condition. It states that the cost (in e¤ective labour units) of producing one additional …rm, F (s t ), must equal the reduction in the number of e¤ective labour units required in the production of goods, i.e. the e¢ ciency gain, brought about by this extra …rm. See (10).
Let us de…ne two wedges, an intrasectoral wedge (s t ) and an intersectoral wedge (s t ). The …rst is de…ned as the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption to the marginal rate of transformation,
The second is the di¤erence between the marginal product of new …rms in the goods production sector and their marginal cost, in terms of labour units,
In the First Best allocation, the two wedges are constant: (s t ) = 1 and (s t ) = 0.
Assuming log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, such that U C (s t ) =
Thus, labour employed in goods production is constant and equal to 1. Substituting this result in the resource constraint (22) and rearranging yields the number of …rms as a function of the exogenous variables,
The number of …rms is proportional to productivity and inversely proportional to the entry cost. Given the number of …rms, we can compute consumption using (25),
Expressing consumption as a function of exogenous variables only, we have
Thus, consumption is increasing in productivity, with elasticity 1 . It is decreasing in the entry cost, with elasticity 1 1 and in government spending, with elasticity 1. Finally, substituting the number of …rms (26) and consumption (27) in the resource constraint (22), we …nd that labour in the First Best is constant 8 ,
8 Note that labour is constant only in the log utility case.
To summarise, the equations (26), (27) and (28) describe the First Best allocation.
Optimal Policy
This section derives the optimal policy following the approach in Ade ao et al (2003) .
First, I collapse all equilibrium conditions into a single equation -the implementability condition -that, together with the resource constraint, restricts the set of implementable allocations for any given policy sequences. Second, I show that under both ‡exible and sticky wages, the optimal interest rate policy is to follow the Friedman Rule. Third, I
characterise the optimal allocations under this policy by deriving the optimal intersectoral and intrasectoral wedges under ‡exible wages and under sticky wages. I show that the ‡exible-wage optimal allocation coincides with the sticky-wage optimal allocation only if labour supply is inelastic. 1. the household present-value budget constraint is satis…ed,
Imperfectly Competitive Equilibrium: Compact Form
2. the resource constraint is satis…ed 9 ,
3. the following equilibrium conditions are satis…ed,
,
as well as
under sticky wages.
Under the assumption of complete contingent claims markets, one can write the consumer budget constraint in present value form. First, weight each equation (12) by the period-0 value of wealth in state s t , Q (s t js 0 ). Second, sum the resulting equations across states and dates, using the no-Ponzi game condition (13) . Doing so eliminates bond holdings from the budget constraint. Finally, substitute the cash-in-advance constraint (11), holding with equality, to eliminate money holdings. Using (5), (6), (7) and (20), …rm pro…ts can be expressed as a fraction of total consumption expenditure divided by the number of active …rms,
We derive (29) using the market clearing condition for shares (21) and the expression for …rm pro…ts (31). Substituting (31) in the …rst order condition for shares yields the free entry condition (30).
Implementability Condition and Planner Problem
The objective of the planner is to choose the model variables so as to maximise the utility of the representative household, taking as given the optimality conditions of the households and the …rms, as well as market clearing. The constraints of the planner problem are all the equilibrium conditions given above. The idea of an implementability condition is that not all of these constraints are restrictive for the planner. By substituting out certain variables (in particular, the prices), the constraints can be condensed in only one equation in addition to the resource constraint. The planner then chooses the allocations that maximise utility, given this implementability condition and the resource constraint.
The planner is free to set a path for lump-sum taxes T (s t ) to satisfy (29), while the , is restricted by the implementability condition
and the resource constraint (22) for any path of the interest rate R (s t ). Equation (32) is derived by combining the free entry condition (30) with the wage setting equation (17) to eliminate W (s t ).
Under sticky wages, the wage setting condition is given by (18). Solving the free entry condition for the price level and substituting the result in the wage setting equation to eliminate P (s t ) gives
= 1
Note that we have cancelled W (s t ), which is known in t 1. Rearranging and using the law of iterated expectations yields the implementability condition under sticky wages,
The constraints of the policy problem are the implementability constraint (33) and the resource constraint (22).
Proposition 1:
The set of implementable allocations under ‡exible wages is contained in the corresponding set under sticky wages. Therefore, the optimal allocation under sticky wages makes households at least as well o¤ as under ‡exible wages. 
where the Lagrangian is
Following Ade ao et al (2003), I …rst derive the optimal interest rate policy before solving for the optimal allocations under this policy. This method di¤ers from the Ramsey approach to optimal policy of …rst solving the primal problem for the optimal allocations and then backing out the policies that support these allocations.
Optimal Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate policy problem under sticky wages is to choose a path for the interest
It is straightforward to show that the Friedman
Rule is optimal irrespective of nominal rigidities.
Proposition 2:
The Friedman Rule is optimal, i.e. the optimal gross interest rate is R (s t ) = 1 for all dates and states.
Proof: The …rst derivative of the Lagrangian is
We have @L @R(s t ) < 0 for ' (s t 1 ) > 0. Welfare, as summarised by L, decreases as the interest rate increases, given the non-negativity constraint on the net interest rate and the fact that the Lagrange multiplier is strictly positive as long as we are away from the First Best. It follows that the nominal interest rate should be as low as possible. Given the lower bound of unity on the gross interest rate, this implies that the Friedman Rule,
As can be seen from (17), the money distortion a¤ects the intratemporal consumptionleisure tradeo¤ decision. It drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour and the real wage. The higher the interest rate, the greater is this wedge. The optimality of the Friedman Rule is a standard result in the literature following Ireland (1996) and is shown to hold under more general conditions in Correia et al (2008) . Notice that at the Friedman Rule, the cash-in-advance constraint is no longer binding and hence the level of real money holdings is indeterminate. This real indeterminacy at the corner solution can be ignored if we consider limiting equilibria where the interest rate approaches unity.
Optimal Allocations under the Friedman Rule
At the Friedman Rule, the planner problem is written as before, with R (s t ) set equal to
Flexible Wages
The …rst order conditions for the policy problem under ‡exible wages imply the following intra-and intersectoral optimal wedges,
Assuming log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, f (s t ) = 1 and the optimal allocation can be written recursively as follows,
Under ‡exible wages, the Friedman Rule is optimal and implements the unique allocation given by (36) to (38), while it does not pin down the price level. At the Friedman Rule, allocations una¤ected by the money supply policy. The size of the money stock a¤ects only (and indeed pins down) the price level P (s t ) through the cash-in-advance constraint. The remaining nominal variables, i.e. …rm prices P (f; s t ), wages W (s t ) and pro…ts D (f; s t ) are then determined residually through (4), (17) and (31), respectively.
The optimal allocation can thus be implemented with a multiplicity of money supply and price level sequences. This is the nominal indeterminacy under ‡exible wages as explained in Ade ao et al (2003) .
The wedge between the First Best and the optimal allocation under ‡exible wages is constant and equals the joint markup in goods and labour markets, 
Sticky Wages
With ‡exible wages, only one margin is distorted: the leisure-consumption choice. Imperfect competition in product and labour markets gives rise to a constant wedge between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
The only handle on this wedge is the nominal interest rate, and the optimal policy is to minimise the wedge by implementing the Friedman Rule. In contrast, with sticky wages, shocks create an additional distortion. Through the money supply instrument, monetary policy can use this additional distortion to its advantage by (partially) undoing the distortion that is present under ‡exible wages whenever a shock hits.
The …rst order conditions of the policy problem under sticky wages imply the following intra-and intersectoral optimal wedges,
Under sticky wages, the Friedman Rule is again optimal. At the Friedman Rule, there are multiple implementable allocations associated with di¤erent money supplies, which all satisfy the implementability condition. Within the set of implementable allocations, the policy maker picks the optimal one, which in general does not coincide with the ‡exible-wage allocation.
Proposition 3:
In general, the optimal allocation under sticky wages welfare-dominates the optimal allocation under ‡exible wages.
Proof: Comparing the sticky-wage optimal wedges with the ‡exible-wage optimal wedges (34) and (35), we see that only if L (s t ) = 1 does the ‡exible-wage allocation satisfy the planner's …rst order conditions under sticky wages. Then f (s t ) = s (s t ) and the optimal wedges coincide.
This is the case of inelastic labour supply studied by Bilbiie et al (2008) . Intuitively, when labour supply is …xed, policy cannot manipulate the leisure-consumption tradeo¤ to its advantage. Then sticky wages do not provide monetary policy with a lever to improve upon the ‡exible-wage allocation.
The assumption of a labour requirement for …rm startups is important for the results of this paper. Since the wage rate is part of the entry cost, wage stickiness a¤ects the entry decision and it is through this e¤ect that monetary policy can in ‡uence the investment margin. In the Appendix, I show a variant of the model in which entry costs are speci…ed in terms of …nal output. In that model, wage stickiness does not alter the set of implementable allocations that the policy maker faces. This is because wages are not part of entry costs and any wage setting restriction therefore does not distort the entry decision. As a result, the optimal allocation is the same under sticky wages as under ‡exible wages. Lewis (2009) compares impulse responses to a monetary policy shock to their empirical counterparts, for di¤erent variants of the endogenous entry model.
Qualitatively, the best-performing model is one in which entry costs are in labour units, rather than in terms of …nal output, and wages are sticky. This evidence leads me to prefer the benchmark model to the modi…ed version.
An Example and Some Intuition
Under log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, the optimal wedges under sticky wages are as follows,
Together with the resource constraint (22) and the implementability constraint,
, and ' (s t 1 ).
In the following, I provide a two-state example 10 for the general case where labour supply is elastic. Consider two states with equal probability and the following calibration (see Table 1 ).
[ insert Table 1 here ]
The elasticity of substitution between goods is set to = 3:8 as in Bilbiie et al (2008) , which is consistent with the estimate in Lewis and Poilly (2010) . Labour types are assumed to be somewhat more substitutable, = 6. Productivity in the pre-shock state is normalised to 1. As for the calibration of entry costs, I use a value close to the one in Barseghyan and DiCecio (2010) , according to whom a ratio [ insert Table 2 here ]
Under sticky wages, the number of …rms, consumption and labour increase more in response to a positive productivity shock than under ‡exible wages. In particular, the expansion in labour under sticky wages allows for a larger increase in the production of both …rms and goods. Similarly, a decrease in the entry cost induces the optimal policy under sticky wages to raise labour, such that the number of …rms and consumption increase more than under ‡exible wages. Importantly, the optimal sticky-wage allocation is more dispersed across states of nature. In response to an expansionary shock, the policy maker exploits the degree of freedom given by the wage rigidity to address the undersupply of labour and the underproduction of goods and …rms. As labour rises beyond its steady state level, both consumption and the number of …rms expand more than in the ‡exible-wage allocation. The responses of the real wage to the shocks are identical to those of consumption. The real wage increases more and thus leisure becomes more expensive in the sticky-wage allocation than in the ‡exible-wage allocation.
To summarise, the nominal wage rigidity, combined with the money supply instrument, allows the policy maker to manipulate the real wage in the face of shocks, a¤ecting directly the consumption-leisure tradeo¤ decision. Optimal policy chooses a di¤erent allocation than the ‡exible-wage allocation by introducing a markup on leisure that is absent under ‡exible wages. Monetary policy can mimick the e¤ect of a labour supply subsidy, which has the same e¤ect to make leisure more expensive relative to consumption.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the implications of …rm entry for optimal monetary policy. The economy has three distortions: product and labour markets are imperfectly competitive, wages are set in advance, consumption purchases must be made with money. The cashin-advance restriction is undone via the Friedman Rule, which aligns the returns on bonds and money. The markup in the goods market is e¢ cient, because pro…ts are needed to cover the entry cost. However, the absence of a markup on leisure implies that leisure is too cheap relative to consumption goods. Therefore, labour is suboptimally low. Due to the labour requirement for producing new …rms, this has a negative e¤ect on entry. Even though implementing the ‡exible allocation, i.e. removing the sticky-wage distortion, is feasible, it is not welfare-maximising. In response to expansionary shocks to productivity and entry costs, the optimal policy implies a larger increase in hours, more consumption and higher entry than is observed in the ‡exible economy. The wage rigidity, combined with the money supply instrument, provides the policy maker with a tool to increase the real wage, moving it closer to its e¢ cient level, in response to such shocks. As a result, more labour is employed at both margins: at the intensive margin (production of goods) and at the extensive margin (production of …rms). The remaining equilibrium conditions are as in the benchmark model.
First Best Allocation
The First Best problem is as follows,
subject to the resource constraint (43). The …rst order conditions satisfy
The intrasectoral e¢ ciency condition (44) Labour is constant in the First Best allocation and unambiguously higher here than in the benchmark model,
When entry costs are speci…ed in units of consumption, the number of …rms in the First Best responds more to productivity shocks and to entry cost shocks than in the benchmark model. The elasticities are greater (in absolute terms) than 1 and 1, respectively. In steady state, the number of …rms and consumption are higher than in the benchmark model.
Implementability Condition and Planner Problem
The set of implementable allocations for (C (s t ) ; L (s t ) ; N (s t )) s t 2S t 1 t=0
is restricted by the free entry condition (39) and the resource constraint (43) for any path of the interest rate R (s t ) 1.
Notice that here, the wage setting scheme does not matter for the optimal allocations.
I.e. if there is wage stickiness, this does not restrict the set of implementable allocations for the policy maker. This is because the wage rate no longer enters the free entry condition and therefore does not a¤ect the investment margin. Since wage stickiness does not matter, monetary policy cannot be used to select allocations. The absence of a labour requirement to set up a …rm removes the potency of monetary policy instrument under sticky wages to a¤ect the investment margin. Lump sum taxes must adjust to satisfy the household budget constraint and the money stock must adjust to satisfy the cash-in-advance constraint. 
Optimal Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate policy problem is to choose a path for the interest rate f(R (s t ) 1) s t 2S t g 1 t=0
to maximise L f o . The …rst order condition is
Because this expression is negative, the Friedman Rule is optimal.
Optimal Allocations under the Friedman Rule
Under the Friedman Rule, we can derive and rearrange the …rst order conditions of the policy problem to express the allocation as follows,
Labour is constant and equal to its First Best level. The number of …rms in the optimal allocation is smaller than in the First Best.
